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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
LORENZO VERNAL EWELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, BYRON EWELL, doing busi-
ness as ASSOCIATED CONSTRUC-
TION COMPANY and THE STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
7700 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts contained in Plaintiff's Brief 
is substantially correct, except the references to the testi-
mony of Dr. Harry Berman. 
Lorenzo V. Ewell, the applicant and plaintiff, filed his 
application with the Industrial Commission on September 
19, 1950, in which he requested compensation for an in-
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dustrial accidental injury. He designated May 29, 1950, as 
the date of the accident and he specified the accidental in-
jury as being caused by a flash from a welding machine 
getting into his eyes. 
In the hearing held by the Industrial Commission on 
November 22, 1950, Dr. Berman testified that he was first 
consulted by Mr. Ewell in April, 1948, for treatment of 
chronic sinusitis with nasal polyps in both sides of his nose. 
Dr Berman next saw him on August 12, 1948. At that time 
Mr. Ewell had a condition called: pterygium in both eyes. 
Pterygium is a patch of thickened conjunctiva extending 
over part of the cornea. In 1948 the pterygi urn in the right 
eye was worse than the one in the left eye. The doctor 
operated on the right eye at that time. The doctor also told 
him that sooner or later he would have to have the pterygium 
in the left eye operated on. 
Mr. Ewell testified that on May 29, 1950, he got a flash 
in his eyes from a welder's torch and his eyes were irritated 
and inflamed from then until July 21, 1950. However, he 
did not lose any time from work until he went to Dr. Ber-
man's office on July 14, 1950. That was. the first time Dr. 
Berman saw him since he removed the pterygium from Mr. 
Ewell's. right eye in 1948. 
Plaintiff's brief has correctly stated that the Industrial 
Commission found that Mr. Ewell was disabled from work 
for one week from July 14, 1950 to July 21, 1950, because of 
inflammation in his eyes resulting from the flash burn; 
also the Commission found and concluded that his accident 
was not the cause of the pterygium in Mr. Ewell's left eye, 
which Dr. Berman operated on July 29, 1950. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE INDUST'RIAL COMMISSION WAS NOT 
LEGALLY REQUIRED T·o HOLD THAT THE 
SURGICAL REMOVAL OF THE PTERYGIUM 
IN APPLICANT'S LEFT EYE WAS COM-
PENSABLE. 
After reading the brief of plaintiff's attorney, it is, not 
quite clear to us whether he is trying to prove a case under 
the workmen's compensation law or the occupational disease 
law. The one and only numbered point in his argument, 
(p. 5), states that "the pterygium in plaintiff's left eye 
was the result of a compensable industrial accident." He 
also specified the electric flash from the welder's torch as 
being the industrial accident responsible for his eye trouble. 
However, on page 7 of his brief, he argues that the ptery-
gium may have been caused by the impact of dust and sand 
on plaintiff's eye ball between August, 1948 and May 29, 
1950, or by the flash burn on May 29, 1950, or partly by 
each of those factors. 
The first of the above mentioned alternatives would 
be an argument for applying the occupational disease law to 
this case. But if Mr. Ewell's eye trouble were definitely 
proved to have been caused by constant irritation from sub-
stances to which he was exposed by his employment, it could 
not come under the workmen's compensation law. The work-
men's compensation law deals with accidents. An accident 
occurs· in a. very short period of time.· On the other hand~ 
an occupational disease is caused· by exposure to harmful 
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substances over a considerable period of time. Has appli-
cant's attorney changed his theory of the case between pages 
5 and 7 of his. brief? 
We are not willing to concede that an applicant has 
the. right to make a claim before the Industrial Commission 
for disability claimed to have resulted from an industrial 
accident, and end up in the Supreme Court claiming benefits 
under the occupational disease law. But, for the sake of 
argument, if he does have the legal right to switch his 
position by starting out with one kind of claim and ending 
up with the other kind or a combination of the two, we do 
not think the record will support plaintiff's challenge of the 
Industrial Commission's, decision. 
The argument contained in plaintiff's brief might have 
been properly directed to the Industrial ·commission after 
its bearing of this claim and 'before it rendered its decision. 
In other words, the points which plaintiff's attorney has 
attempted to make might have been addressed to the In-
dustrial Commission in an effort to persuade the commis-
sion to arrive at certain findings and conclusions from the 
evidence in the record. But most of the argument in the 
brief is not properly addressed to the Supreme Court. 
Plaintiff's argument amounts substantially to the prop-
osition that inasmuch as there was medical evidence that 
the pterygium in applicant's left eye coulm have been aggra-
vated by the electric flash on May 29, 1950, or by continual 
irritation from wind and dust in his employment for a period 
of almost two years, the Industrial Commission was there-
by required, as a matter of law, to find that such was the 
fact and award compensation to him for the operation. 
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Plaintiff's attorney apparently has overlooked the 
legislative demarcation between the powers and functions 
of the Industrial Commission and the Supreme Court in 
workmen's compensation and occupational disease cases. 
Section 42-1-79 of the workmen's· compensation law p~o­
vides: 
"The findings and conclusions of the commission 
on questions of fact shall be conclusive and final and 
shall not be subject to review; such questions of fact 
shall include ultimate facts and the findings and 
conclusions of the commission." 
Substantially the same provision is found in Section 
42-la-40 of the occupational disease law. 
In the case of Crane vs. Industrial Commission, 97 Utah 
244, 92 Pac. (2nd) 722, the facts were that on April4, 1938, 
Mr. Crane fell while he was at work in his employer's mine 
and injured his back and knee. He continued to work until 
May 7th, on which date his leg was red and swollen and 
ached cons,iderably. He was examined by a doctor on May 
lOth and his knee was found to be seriously infected. On 
May 14th a core was taken from his knee. After a hearing, 
the Industrial Commission denied his claim for compensa-
tion; and the Supreme Court sustained ·the commission's 
decision. In its decision, the Supreme Court quoted the 
following language from the Kent and Parker cases: 
Kent vs. Industrial Commission, 89 Utah 381, 57 Pac. 
(2nd) 724. 
"In the case of denial of compensation, the · rec-
ord must disclose that there is material, substantial, 
competent, uncontradicted evidence sufficient to 
make a disregard of its justify the conclusion, as a 
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matter of law, that the Industrial Commission arbi-
trarily and capriciously disregarded the evidence or 
unreasonably refused to believe such evidence. 
* * * When we are asked to overturn the find-
ings and conclusions of the commission denying com-
pensation, it must be made clearly to appear that the 
commission acted wholly without cause in rejecting 
or in refus~ing to believe or give effect to the evi-
dence. It is not intended by the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act (Rev. St. 1933, 42-1-1 et seq.) that 
this, court, in matters of evidence, should to any ex-
tent substitute the judgment of the court upon fac-
tual matters for the judgment of the commission." 
Parker vs. lndtustrial Commission, 78 Utah 509, 5 Pac. 
(2nd) 573. 
"This court is not authorized to weigh conflict-
ing evidence, nor is it authorized to direct which one 
of two or more reasonable inferences must be drawn 
from evidence which is not in conflict. That is the 
peculiar province of the Industrial Commission." 
In the case of Hutc-hings vs. Industrial Commission, 96 
Utah 399, 87 Pac. (2nd) 11, toward the end of the court's 
opinion is found the following: 
"The question before the court is whether the 
Industrial Commission, upon the record before it, 
was, required as a matter of law to award compensa-
tion. In Globe Grain & Milling Company vs. lndus-
trwl Commission, 57 Utah 192, 193 Pac. 642, 643, 
we stated the rule applicable here in the following 
language: 
"This court has repeatedly held that it will not 
weigh the evidence, but will examine the same for the 
purpose only of determining whether there is any 
substantial competent evidence to sustain the find-
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ings or to support the award made by the commis-
sion. * * * If there is such evidence the find-
ings will be sustained." 
"And so it has been held in numerous cases 
that the decision of the Industrial Commission will 
not be disturbed where the evidence was such that 
the Commission could reasonably find or conclude 
that the death or disability of the employee was not 
the result of accidental injury arising out of or in 
the course of employment." 
In the case of Holbrook vs. Ind'ustrial Commission, 92 
Utah 251, 67 Pac. (2nd) 224, Eugene Holbrook, a night 
watchman employed at the Wright Store in Ogden, died 
June 30, 1936, from malignant endocarditis and geralized 
septicemia. His widow applied for compensation, claiming 
that his death was the result of an accidental injury suffered 
March 9, 1936, when he fell down a flight of stairs, at his 
employer's premises. The medical expert who testified be-
fore the Industrial Commission on behalf of the applicant, 
was not very definite or clear in his opinion with respect to 
causative connection between the accident and the death. 
In sustaining the Industrial Commission's decision denying 
the claim, the Supreme Court used the following language: 
"While the testimony in this: case certainly 
would have supported an award-in fact seems to 
point rather decidedly that the fall aggravated a pre-
existing condition-yet, that question was for the 
commission. The failure of the commission to arrive 
at such conclusion, but to an opposite one that the 
accident did not cause or contribute to decedent's 
death, is not arbitrary. The commission, as in the 
case of Norris vs. Industrial Commission, 90 Utah 
256, 61 Pac. (2nd) 413, has concluded that the 
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~evidence of such connection was not satisfactorily 
established. In that case there were conflicting 
opinions of doctors. Here there was one doctor as 
a witness and he himself furnishes conflicting opin-
ions. He evidently was not very positive as. to the 
real cause of the death. Under the rule in the Norris 
case, the finding of the commission was not arbi-
trary. See also 0' Brien vs. Industrial Commission, 
90 Utah 266, 61 Pac. (2nd) 418, as to the effect of 
the testimony of 'probable cause.' Other cases in 
which this court considered the matter of opinion 
evidence in indus trial cases are : 
Parker vs. Industrial Commission, 78 Utah 509, 
5 Pac. (2nd) 573; 
Stanley vs. Industrial Commission, 79 Utah 
228, 8 Pac. (2nd) 770; 
Russell v~. Industrial Commission, 86 Utah 306, 
43 Pac. (2nd) 1069." 
Dr. Berman told Mr. Ewell in 1948 that the pterygium 
which he then had in his left eye would eventually have to 
be operated on (R. 18). Dr. Berman also testified that that 
condition would not clear up without medical treatment 
(R. 14). He also testified that from the last time he saw 
it in 1948 until the next time he saw it in July, 1950, the 
pterygium had increased to the point where it needed surgi-
cal treatment (R. 15). 
Dr Berman testified that the electric· flash of May 29, 
1950, could have aggravated the pterygium or increased its 
rate of growth. He also said that a pterygium's growth can 
progress or can remain stationary for a while ( R. 21) . 
Everything is possible in medicine ( R. 21) . 
That kind of evidence certainly would not compel the 
Industrial Commission, as a matter of law, to come to the 
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conclusion that the electric flash of May 29, 1950, was re-
sponsible for requiring the surgery on the pterygium in 
Mr. Ewell's left eye, which was performed on July 29, 
1950. 
Even if it were legal and proper for plaintiff to attempt 
to make this. case a dual proceeding under both the work-
men's compensation law and the occupational disease law, 
we have shown that there is no legal basis upon which the 
Industrial Commission might be reversed because of its 
refusal to find a connection between the flash of May 29, 
1950, and the pterygium operation. Then the possibilities of 
any application of the occupational disease law to the circum-
stances of this case must be considered on their own merits. 
Section 42-1a-28 of the occupational disease law lists 28 
occupational diseases which are compensable. The first 27 
mentioned, refer to metallic poisonings and other specific 
disorders which are known to result from exposure to harm-
ful substances used or existing in various. indus tries.. None 
of these 27 could apply to Mr. Ewell's case. Subsection 28 
was added to this section by the 1949 Legislature. It con-
tains the only possibility of any provision of the occupational 
disease law applying to this. case. But subsection 28 is 
limited to those cases in which all of its provisions exist. 
We quote: 
Section 42-1a-28, subsection 28. 
Such other diseases or injuries to health which 
directly arise as a natural incident of the exposure 
occasioned by the employment, provided, however, 
that such a disease ~r injury to health shall be com~ 
pensable only in those instances where it is shown 
by the employee or his dependents that all of the 
following named circumstances were ··present: ( 1) a 
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direct causal conne-ction between the conditions un-
der which the- work is performed and the disease or 
injury to health; (2) the disease or injury to health 
can be seen to have followed as· a natural incident of 
the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the 
employment; ( 3) the disease or injury to health can 
be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate 
cause; ( 4) the disease or injury to health is not of 
a character to which the employee may have had sub-
stantial exposure outside of the employment; ( 5) the 
disease or injury to health is incidental to the char-
acter of the business and not independent of the rela-
tion of the employer and the employee ; and ( 6) the 
disease or injury to health must appear to have had 
its, origin in a risk connected with the employment 
and to have flowed from that source as a natural 
consequence, though it need not have been forseen 
or expected before discovery. No disease or injury to 
health shall be found compensable where it is of a 
character to which the general public is commonly 
exposed. 
All six of those provisions were not proved in this case. 
In fact, applicant and his, attorney made no attempt to 
prove a case before the Industrial Commission under this 
section. They made no reference to the occupational disease 
law in the proceedings before the Industrial Commission or 
in their brief which was recently filed in this Court. The 
testimony did contain a few casual remarks about some of 
Mr. Ewell's work at times being in dusty atmosphere. 
Also Dr. Berman observed that wind and dust could irritate 
a pterygium and increase its rate of growth. Dr Berman 
made the general statement that "anything which comes in 
contact with a pterygium makes. it grow faster and encroach 
on the cornea" ( R. 18) . 
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Wind and dust were only some of the elements which 
might have irritated and aggravated applicant's pterygium. 
Wind and dust which he contacted outside of his employment 
would have caused such irritation and aggravation the same 
as that in his employment. 
There was no evidence in this case that the condition 
of pterygium is "incidental to the character of the business." 
in which Mr. Ewell was engaged, as is required by the fifth 
provision of subsection 28, which we have heretofore quoted. 
Even if all of our foregoing arguments relating to the 
occupational disease law were held to not apply to this case, 
and if the Court should hold that all of the requirements of 
subsection 28 of Section 42-1a-28 had been satisfied with 
respect to aggravation of the pterygium in plaintiff's. left eye 
by substances in his employment, it would then be necessary 
that a determination be made of the proportionate causation 
of plaintiff's trouble, as provided by Section 42-1a-51 of the 
occupational disease law. 
Before concluding this brief, we feel impelled to ob-
serve that the remarks of plaintiff's attorney on page 12 of 
his brief, regarding plaintiff's. economic means are entirely 
improper and are not in accordance with this Court's rules 
or the statute relating to review proceedings such as this. 
There is no evidence whatever in the record as to what plain-
tiff's financial condition is or was, except the fact that his 
wages were $100.00 per week on May 29, 1950 (R. 5, 9 
and 10). 
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CONCLUSION 
In view of the evidence and the law governing this case, 
it appears that the Industrial Commission's decision award-
ed all of the compensation benefits to which applicant was 
entitled. Therefore the Commission's decision should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General, 
F. A. TROTTIER, 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
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